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ESTABLISHING RECOVERY FOR LOSS
OF ENJOYMENT OF LIFE APART FROM
CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING:
McDOUGALD v. GARBER
Damages in personal injury actions are awarded to compensate
the plaintiff for the loss he or she has sustained.' Customarily, the
recovery is segregated into recompense for medical expenses, loss
of earning capacity, and conscious pain and suffering.2 Conscious
pain and suffering is treated as a unitary concept because of the
intimate relation of its two component elements,3 encompassing
' See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 8.1, at 540 (1973); 1 M. MINZER,
DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 1.00, at 1-3 (1987); Comment, Loss of Enjoyment of Life -
Should It Be a Compensable Element of Personal Injury Damages?, 11 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 459, 459 (1975). "The primary purpose of awarding 'compensatory damages' is to place
the injured party in the same position that party would have occupied had the wrong not
occurred." 1 M. MINZER, supra, § 1.00, at 1-3. An award of money damages is the generally
recognized way of compensating the person for the loss sustained. See Thompson v. Na-
tional R.R. Passenger Corp., 621 F.2d 814, 824 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1035 (1980).
The primary goal of the awards is to compensate the plaintiff, not to punish the
tortfeasor; therefore, punitive or exemplary damages are generally not awarded in personal
injury actions. See 3 L. FRUMER, R. BENOIT & M. FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS, DE-
FENSES, DAMAGES § 2.02, at 21-23 (1965) [hereinafter PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS]; 4 F.
HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.5A, at 526 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter
THE LAW OF TORTS].
2 See D. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 8.1, at 540; Comment, Loss of Enjoyment of Life as an
Element of Damages, 73 DICK. L. REv. 639, 639 (1969); Comment, Loss of Enjoyment of Life
as a Separate Element of Damages, 12 PAC. L.J. 965, 965-66 (1981).
The general category of medical expenses includes all forms of treatment received be-
cause of the injury, as well as that treatment reasonably expected to be necessary in the
future. See PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS, supra note 1, § 3.04, at 111-13.
Loss of earning capacity is regarded as "the difference between the capacity to work
and to earn money before and after [the] injury." Id. at 127. Actual lost earnings constitute
an element of lost earning capacity, but are not dispositive of this element of damages. See
id. at 127-28.
For a detailed discussion of the concept of conscious pain and suffering, see infra notes
3-4 and accompanying text.
I See THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 1, § 25.10, at 571 ("There is no clear line of
distinction between physical pain and mental suffering; nor does the law insist on drawing
one."); Koskoff, The Nature of Pain and Suffering, 13 TRIAL, July 1977, at 21-22. Koskoff
noted that "[s]uffering in the language of the law is traditionally coupled with pain. They
are invariably conjoined. Thus, over time, a Doctrine of Pain and Suffering has been cre-
ated." Id.
Compensation for pain and suffering usually constitutes the largest portion of the dam-
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both the physical pain experienced as a result of one's injury, and
one's emotional reaction to that physical pain. Many jurisdictions
include "loss of enjoyment of life" as an element of the conscious
pain and suffering award. Other jurisdictions, however, noting
ages for a personal injury action. See 1 M. MINZER, supra note 1, § 4.01, at 4-6. As with the
other elements of damages, recovery for pain and suffering includes both past pain and
suffering and that which is likely to be experienced in the future. See D. DOBBS, supra note
1, § 8.1, at 540; THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 1, § 25.10, at 570.
4 See 1 M. MINZER, supra note 1, §§ 4.10-4.11, at 4-20-4-24. One commentator has sug-
gested that pain and suffering is actually made up of three distinct elements: (1) physical
pain; (2) mental suffering arising from awareness of such pain; and (3) mental anguish en-
compassing the unpleasant mental consequences of the injury. See id. § 4.10, at 4-20.
"Pain" is not easily defined; one suggested definition is as follows: "Pain is that specific
bodily sensation which is commonly evoked by a variety of different forms of energy intense
enough to injure the body at least minimally or transiently." 4 L. CHAPMAN, COURTROOM
MEDICINE § 2.05, at 2-6 (1988). This definition, however, evidences the difficulty in defining
such a subjective term. See generally id. § 2.01, at 2-2 (discussing difficulty of defining
pain).
The concept of "suffering" has proven to be no more amenable to definition than
"pain," as it is also based on a subjective standard; one suggested definition is that
"[s]uffering is a mood in which anxiety/depression predominates. There is no suffering with-
out anxiety/depression." Koskoff, supra note 3, at 23. Suffering is generally recognized as
the emotional component of the pain and suffering award and it embraces such elements as
"fright, fear, shock, apprehension, worry and anxiety, humiliation and embarrassment,
wounded feelings, psychasthenia, and other forms of emotional distress, that are the proxi-
mate consequences of the physical injury." PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS, supra note 1, § 3.04,
at 65-66 (footnotes omitted).
Pain and suffering is an intangible loss for which the jury is given broad discretion,
subject to the strictures of a "reasonableness" standard. See D. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 8.1,
at 545; THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 1, § 25.10, at 563-565; cf. infra note 35 (discussing
statutory enactments in New York that modify the standard of appellate review). A gener-
ally recognized limitation on the award is that it be for "conscious" pain and suffering. See
THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 1, § 25.10, at 563. For a further discussion of the "conscious-
ness" requirement, see infra notes 22, 44 and accompanying text.
A substantial amount of critical commentary has addressed the issue of pain and suffer-
ing. See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 8.1, at 550-51 (discussing articles calling for
abolition or amendment of pain and suffering concept); THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 1, §
25.10, at 563 n.2 (noting "[c]ritical and provocative treatments" of issue).
1 See, e.g., Hoskie v. United States, 666 F.2d 1353, 1357 (10th Cir. 1981) (New Mexico
law includes "impairment of physical and social activities as damages for pain and suffer-
ing"); Huff v. Tracy, 57 Cal. App. 3d 939, 943, 129 Cal. Rptr. 551, 553 (1976) ("A separate
enjoyment-of-life instruction only repeats what is effectively communicated by the pain-
and-suffering instruction."); Long v. Yellow Cab Co., 137 M. App. 3d 324, 329, 484 N.E.2d
830, 832 (1985) (included in general damages); Poyzer v. McGraw, 360 N.W.2d 748, 753
(Iowa 1985) (loss of enjoyment of life is part of future pain and suffering); Ledogar v. Gior-
dano, 122 App. Div. 2d 834, 838, 505 N.Y.S.2d 899, 903 (2d Dep't 1986) (effect of injury on
normal pursuits of life part of pain and suffering); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Lane, 720 S.W.2d
830, 834 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (part of general damages or pain and suffering); Judd v.
Rowley's Cherry Hill Orchards, Inc., 611 P.2d 1216, 1221 (Utah 1980) (diminished enjoy-
ment of life part of pain and suffering); see also 4B L. CHAPMAN, supra note 4, § 121.10, at
121 & n.1 (discussing loss of enjoyment of life as part of either general damages or pain and
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conceptual differences between conscious pain and suffering and
loss of enjoyment of life, have denoted the latter an independent
category of damages.' Recently, in McDougald v. Garber,7 the Ap-
suffering and listing additional cases recognizing this concept); THE LAW OF TORTS, supra
note 1, § 25.10A, at 575-76 & 576 n.4 (same); 2 M. MINZER, supra note 1, § 8.12, at 8-27 &
n.1 (1986) (same); Comment, supra note 2, at 967 & n.15 (same).
Damages for loss of enjoyment of life are granted as compensation for "interference[s]
with the injured person's ability to lead what would have been a normal lifestyle in the
absence of injury." 2 M. MINZER, supra note 1, § 8.01, at 8-4 (1986). As would be expected
with such an expansive definition, recovery for loss of enjoyment of life encompasses a broad
spectrum of activities, including restrictions of abilities to engage in recreational pursuits,
inability to partake in family activities, and losses of senses of smell or taste. See Comment,
supra note 1, at 459-60; see also Burke v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 981, 1000 (D. Md.
1985) (ability of "loving mother and wife ... to provide emotional support and physical
companionship to her family" impaired); Powell v. Hegney, 239 So. 2d 599, 599 (Fla. Dist
Ct. App. 1970) ("no longer able to swim competitively and was restricted in other activities,
sportswise and socially"); Long, 137 Ill. App. 3d at 327, 484 N.E.2d at 832 (active in
sports-tennis, running, and bicycling); Gallo v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 112 App. Div. 2d
345, 347, 491 N.Y.S.2d 796, 798 (2d Dep't 1985) ("formerly healthy, athletic, social, confi-
dent and helpful young man has now become a virtual recluse"); Alexander v. Eldred, 100
App. Div. 2d 666, 667, 473 N.Y.S.2d 864, 866 (3d Dep't) (volleyball, tennis, and skiing),
afl'd, 63 N.Y.2d 460, 472 N.E.2d 996, 483 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1984); Sternemann v. Langs, 93
App. Div. 2d 819, 820, 460 N.Y.S.2d 614, 616 (2d Dep't 1983) ("has been deprived of a social
life, can no longer properly care for her young children"); Corcoran v. McNeal, 400 Pa. 14,
21, 161 A.2d 367, 372 (1960) (lost sense of smell and taste); Cantu v. Del Carmen Pena, 650
S.W.2d 906, 910 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (unable to engage in gardening, yardwork, cooking,
and housework).
One commentator has suggested that loss of enjoyment of life can be defined in two
ways: "(1) Descriptively, where the injury consists of a permanent impairment of a mental
or physical faculty.. . [and] (2) Operationally, where the direct physical or mental injuries
measure among their consequences the injured party's reasonable withdrawal from one or
more family, social, career, or recreational pursuits or activities . . . ." 2 M. MINZER, supra
note 1, § 8.01, at 8-8-8-10 (1986).
6 See, e.g., Rufino v. United States, 829 F.2d 354, 362 (2d Cir. 1987) (predicting New
York law will recognize separate elements); Thompson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp.,
621 F.2d 814, 824 (6th Cir.) ("Pain and suffering ... and loss of enjoyment of life each
represent separate losses which the victim incurs."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1035 (1980);
Pierce v. New York Cent. R.R., 409 F.2d 1392, 1398-99 (6th Cir. 1969) (separate awards not
reversible error); Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6, 12 (Wyo. 1980) (either separate awards or
part of general damages is acceptable).
The basis for the distinction between the two concepts is that "pain and suffering com-
pensates the victim for the physical and mental discomfort caused by the injury [while] loss
of enjoyment of life compensates the victim for the limitations on the person's life created
by the injury." Thompson, 621 F.2d at 824; see also 4B L. CHAPMAN, supra note 4, § 121.11,
at 121-5-121-6 (suggesting same distinction); 2 M. MINZER, supra note 1, § 8.01[1], at 8-16
(1986) (citing Thompson, 621 F.2d at 824).
Despite the foregoing, many courts refuse to distinguish recovery for loss of enjoyment
of life from that for pain and suffering. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. The pri-
mary reason expressed for not separating the two concepts is fear of duplicative recovery.
See, e.g., Akers v. Kelley Co., 173 Cal. App. 3d 633, 655, 219 Cal. Rptr. 513, 526 (1985)
("vice of coupling 'pain and suffering' with 'loss of enjoyment of life' is that the door is
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pellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
drew this same distinction and held that loss of enjoyment of life is
a separate element of damages from conscious pain and suffering.'
Further, the court held that recovery for loss of enjoyment of life,
unlike that for conscious pain and suffering, does not require cog-
nitive awareness of one's loss as a prerequisite to recovery.,
In McDougald, plaintiff Emma McDougald suffered severe
brain damage while undergoing a cesarian section and tubal liga-
tion.10 She fell into a coma and remained unconscious continuously
thereafter.11 She and her husband, Johnny McDougald, instituted
an action alleging medical malpractice against the obstetrician/
gynecologist-surgeon, the anesthesiologists, and the hospital.12 The
jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs for $11,150,1021s
which was reduced pursuant to post-trial motions to $6,296,728.14
An appeal ensued based upon the lower court's ruling that loss of
thereby opened to double compensation"); Poyzer, 360 N.W.2d at 753 ("It would be plainly
duplicative to allow a separate award for loss of enjoyment of life."). A second reason that
has been offered is that the conjectural nature of damages for loss of enjoyment of life pre-
cludes recovery. See Hogan v. Sante Fe Trail Transp., 148 Kan. 720, 728, 85 P.2d 28, 32
(1938). This criticism, however, is rarely expressed today and virtually all jurisdictions allow
recovery for loss of enjoyment of life either as a part of, or separate from, other damages.
See 2 M. MINZER, supra note 1, § 8.02, at 8-19 (1986).
7 135 App. Div. 2d 80, 524 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1st Dep't 1988), leave to appeal granted, Nos.
M-537, M-553, M-565 (App. Div. 1st Dep't Mar. 15, 1988).
8 Id. at 82, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 193. The Appellate Division, Second Department, relying,
inter alia, on the McDougald decision, recently reached the same conclusion. See Nussbaum
v. Gibstein, No. 2568E, slip op. at 2 (App. Div. 2d Dep't July 5, 1988).
9 Id. at 82, 94, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 193, 200.
10 Id. at 82, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 193. The incident occurred on September 7, 1978 and
resulted from the plaintiff's failure to receive sufficient oxygen, a condition known as anoxia.
Id. Nevertheless, the infant was born healthy. Id.
11 Id. The court also noted that Mrs. McDougald "is a permanent spastic quadriplegic
with incontinence of urine and feces." Id.
12 See id.
1 Id. The jury awarded $1,500,000 to Johnny McDougald for loss of services and
$9,650,102 to Emma McDougald which was itemized as follows: loss of earnings -$770,978;
future custodial care - $2,025,750; future nursing care - $2,353,375; conscious pain and suf-
fering - $1,000,000; and loss of enjoyment of life - $3,500,000. See McDougald v. Garber, 132
Misc. 2d 457, 458, 504 N.Y.S.2d 383, 384 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1986). It should be noted
that while the damages were reported as listed above, the total actually equaled $11,150,103,
with Mrs. McDougald's award being $9,650,103.
U See McDougald, 135 App. Div. 2d at 82, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 193. The award was reduced
by striking the recovery for future nursing care as it was "not supported by the evidence,"
see id. at 87, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 196, and by lowering the collective award of $4,500,000 for
conscious pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life to $2,000,000 due to excessiveness.
See id. The other itemized damages, plus Johnny McDougald's derivative award for loss of
services, were not disturbed. See id.
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enjoyment of life is a separately compensable element of damages
for which cognitive awareness is not required. 5 The Appellate Di-
vision of the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling and
dismissed the appeal.16
Writing for the court, Justice Sullivan acknowledged that nu-
merous New York decisions had included loss of enjoyment of life
as an element of conscious pain and suffering.17 Nevertheless, the
court, while noting the risk of duplicative recovery' 8 and the inher-
ent difficulty in affording compensation for intangible losses, 9 as-
serted that the two elements were distinguishable and deserved
separate compensation." The court also suggested that appellate
review would be facilitated by recognition of this distinction."'
Furthermore, the court held that the requirement of cognitive
awareness, which is generally regarded as a sine qua non to recov-
ery for pain and suffering,22 is not applicable to damages for loss of
18 See id. at 82, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 193. The other issues raised on appeal involved the
admissibility of expert testimony, see id. at 94-95, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 201, and theories of
malpractice. See id. at 95-96, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 201-02. Each of these allegations of error was
dismissed, see id. at 94-96, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 201-02, as was the plaintiffs' cross-appeal re-
garding the recovery for future nursing care. See id. at 96, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
I6 !d.
17 See id. at 89, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 197-98. The court pointed out that the majority of
New York cases expressing this view have done so in the context of appellate review of
damages for pain and suffering. See id. at 89, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
18 See id. at 90, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 198.
19 See id. at 91, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 198-99. The court stated that while pain and suffering
may be a more tangible concept, damages for each loss can be calculated. See id. Objection
to loss of enjoyment of life as an element of damages based on its uncertainty is often raised
but generally rejected as it is no more difficult to calculate these damages than those for
pain and suffering. See 2 M. MINZER, supra note 1, § 8.22, at 8-38-8-40 (1986); see also Story
Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931) (risk of uncer-
tainty in tort damages should be placed on wrongdoer).
20 See McDougald, 135 App. Div. 2d at 91, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
21 See id. at 91-92, 94, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 199-200. The court suggested that recognition of
a separate element of damages is consonant with CPLR 4111(d), N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R
4111(d) (McKinney Supp. 1988), which requires itemized verdicts in malpractice cases. See
id. at 94, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 200. One of the reasons for this requirement is to assist appellate
review of the excessiveness or inadequacy of damage awards. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN &
A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE § 4111.13, at 41-205 (1987). The requirement of item-
ized verdicts in malpractice actions has been extended to all actions seeking recovery for
personal injury, injury to property, or wrongful death. See N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 4111(f)
(McKinney Supp. 1988). This provision is applicable to actions commenced on or after July
30, 1986. See id. at notes. For a further discussion of statutory enactments that attempt to
control jury verdicts, see infra note 35 and accompanying text.
22 See McDougald, 135 App. Div. 2d at 194, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 200. The clause is gener-
ally known as "conscious pain and suffering" and, as the adjective connotes, requires plain-
tiffs to be "conscious of [their] pain and suffering." See THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 1, §
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enjoyment of life since lack of consciousness does not eliminate
one's inability to engage in ordinary activities.23
The McDougald court recognized loss of enjoyment of life as
an element of damages that is distinct from conscious pain and
suffering, and which does not demand cognitive awareness for its
recovery. It is submitted, however, that while plaintiffs deserve to
be properly compensated for their losses, regardless of their cogni-
tive state, the court's recognition of loss of enjoyment of life as a
separate component of the damage award was erroneous. This
Comment will discuss the court's attempt to distinguish loss of en-
joyment of life from conscious pain and suffering, and suggest that
because recovery for conscious pain and suffering has always in-
cluded recoupment for loss of enjoyment of life, demarcating the
two concepts creates an unnecessary opportunity for duplicative
recovery. In addition, it will be asserted that while the court's ulti-
mate decision to allow the comatose plaintiff recovery for loss of
enjoyment of life was correct, the court should have limited the
scope of its holding to encompass only similarly situated plaintiffs.
DUPLICATIVE REcOVERY
The McDougald court allowed the plaintiff, whom the court
regarded as having some cognitive capacity,2 4 to recover damages
25.10, at 563 n.1. In this context, however, it should be noted that courts often allow recov-
ery when very little awareness is exhibited. See id.
22 See McDougald, 135 App. Div. 2d at 93-94, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 200. The court relied in
large measure on two English cases recognizing "loss of amenities" as a distinct element of
damages that does not require cognitive awareness to be recovered. See id.; see also Com-
ment, Nonpecuniary Damages for Comatose Tort Victims, 61 GEO. L.J. 1547, 1549-1551
(1973) (discussing these English cases). "Loss of amenities refers to loss of enjoyment of
life." R. DIAS & B. MARKESINIs, THE ENGLISH LAW OF TORTS 220 (1976). The court also relied
on a recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Rufino v.
United States, 829 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1987). See McDougald, 135 App. Div. 2d at 92-93, 524
N.Y.S.2d at 199-200. The Rufino court allowed recovery for loss of enjoyment of life absent
consciousness based primarily on the lower court decision of Justice Gammerman in the
McDougald case. See Rufino, 829 F.2d at 360-61.
The McDougald court stated that not only is cognitive awareness unnecessary, but also
that the plaintiff need not possess the ability to spend the award. See McDougald, 135 App.
Div. 2d at 94, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 200. This assertion direc ly contradicts a ruling by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit refusing to allow recovery for loss of enjoy-
ment of life to a similarly situated plaintiff on the grounds that the award was punitive. See
Flannery v. United States, 718 F.2d 108, 111 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226
(1984).
2 See McDougald, 135 App. Div. 2d at 87-88, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 197. The court noted
that evidence of some cognition, adduced by the plaintiffs' expert, the attending nurses, and
the husband-plaintiff, was sufficient to support the jury's finding. Id. at 88, 524 N.Y.S.2d at
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for loss of enjoyment of life over and above her recoupment for
conscious pain and suffering.2 In reaching this decision, the court
relied on the decisions of other jurisdictions and the opinions of
numerous commentators which have suggested that, while the con-
cepts are often equated, loss of enjoyment of life is distinguishable
from conscious pain and suffering.26 Loss of enjoyment of life, it
has been argued, compensates one for the loss of his or her capac-
ity to enjoy life, an objective standard, while conscious pain and
suffering concerns the physical discomfort and concomitant mental
anguish that one experiences. 27 Although a semantic argument can
be constructed for this distinction, it is submitted that the court's
holding ignores the practice of the trial advocate to include objec-
tive evidence of loss of enjoyment of life as part of the proof of
conscious pain and suffering.
Leading authorities on personal injury law, including those
cited by the McDougald court, suggest that proof of conscious pain
and suffering is facilitated by the presentation of "objective" evi-
dence of such suffering.2" One who represents himself as "anxious"
197.
21 See id. at 82, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 193.
28 See id. at 89-92, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 198-99; see also supra note 6 and accompanying
text (discussing distinction).
2 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. The trial judge's charge to the jury in
McDougald further suggests the conceptual distinction between the elements: "[D]amages
for pain and suffering compensate the injured person for the conscious physical and mental
discomfort caused by the injury. Damages for loss of the normal pleasures and pursuits of
life compensate the injured person for the limitations on his or her life created by the in-
jury." McDougald v. Garber, 132 Misc. 2d 457, 462, 504 N.Y.S.2d 383, 387 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1986).
28 See PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS, supra note 1, § 3.04, at 62, 69; 1 M. MINZER, supra
note 1, § 4.1311], at 4-28, 4-31. One commentator has noted, regarding proof of pain and
suffering, that:
[P]laintiff's counsel should strive to develop as much objective evidence of pain
and suffering as possible, as a means of convincing the trier of fact that the plain-
tiff is neither feigning those effects nor malingering. Whether the pain and suffer-
ing are "objective" depends on ... the behavioral consequences or changes in the
plaintiff's lifestyle which can be attributed to the alleged pain and suffering.
Id. at 4-28. A clear example of the plaintiff's double-edged use of loss of enjoyment of life is
as follows:
In addition, the plaintiff - particularly one with a genuinely serious injury - has an
excellent opportunity to enhance an award of damages for pain and suffering by
presenting proof as to the adverse effects of the injuries on his or her daily activi-
ties. Withdrawal from participation in family, business, social, or recreational ac-
tivities pursued and enjoyed prior to the time of injury can be effective evidence
that the plaintiff's claims of pain, anxiety, depression, embarrassment, fear, or hu-
miliation are real, and not exaggerated.
[Vol. 62:332
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about his inability to care for his family, and thus seeks recovery
for conscious pain and suffering, should attempt to present evi-
dence of the familial relationship that existed prior to the inci-
dent.29 Similarly, one who is attempting to demonstrate how his
disfigurement has caused him "humiliation" should offer evidence
that he no longer possesses an active social life.30 The same evi-
dence that is used to prove conscious pain and suffering is then
utilized to show loss of enjoyment of life.3' The New York cases
that preceded the McDougald decision apparently recognized this
commingling process since they included loss of enjoyment of life
as part of the award for conscious pain and suffering.32 Thus, the
Id. at 4-31; see also 1 A. AUERBACH, HANDLING ACCIDENT CASES § 92, at 1:232-1:235 (1958)
(discussing loss of enjoyment of life as proof of mental stress); 4B L. CHAPMAN, supra note 4,
§ 120.32, at 120-25 (criteria for proving pain and suffering include "comparison of pre- and
post-accident habits and pursuits"); 3 J. KELNER, PERSONAL INJURY - SUCCESSFUL LrnIGATION
TECHNIQUES 65-66 (1986) (discussing use of lay testimony to prove pain and suffering).
Despite the exhortations of the foregoing authorities, the McDougald court held that
pain and suffering was distinguishable from loss of enjoyment of life. McDougald, 135 App.
Div. 2d at 82, 91, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 193, 199; see also PERSONAL INJURY ACTMONS, supra note 1,
§ 3.04, at 186 ("Failure to differentiate between loss of enjoyment as evidence of damage,
and loss of enjoyment as an element of damages, has resulted in a denial of recovery or
admissibility of such evidence.").
2 See, e.g., Birkhill v. Todd, 20 Mich. App. 356, 365-66, 174 N.W.2d 56, 61 (1969)
(plaintiff entitled to recovery for "worry, anxiety, distress or apprehension 'about finances
and [his] wife at home' "); Warmsley v. City of New York, 89 App. Div. 2d 982, 984, 454
N.Y.S.2d 144, 146 (2d Dep't 1982) (plaintiff's pain and suffering included worry that "her
husband does not have the same emotional feeling towards her because she is a one-legged
woman"). In addition, the actual interference with the plaintiff's family relations would be
separately compensable under the concept of loss of enjoyment of life. See 2 M. MINZER,
supra note 1, § 8.35, at 8-73-8-80 (1986).
20 See, e.g., Gallo v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 112 App. Div. 2d 345, 346-47, 491
N.Y.S.2d 796, 798 (2d Dep't 1985) (extensive burns disfigured plaintiff's body, resulting in
"fear of contact with people"); Judd v. Rowley's Cherry Hill Orchards, Inc., 611 P.2d 1216,
1221 (Utah 1980) (pain and suffering includes "humiliation and embarrassment from per-
manent scars and disability"). In addition, interferences with the plaintiff's social life would
add to his or her recovery for loss of enjoyment of life. See 2 M. MIINZER, supra note 1, §
8.35, at 8-73-8-80 (1986).
31 See 4B L. CHAPMAN, supra note 4, § 121.02, at 121-2. Loss of enjoyment of life has
been defined by factors which include the inability to engage in family and recreational
activities. See id.; see also supra note 5 (discussing loss of enjoyment of life).
22 See, e.g., Kavanaugh v. Nussbaum, 129 App. Div. 2d 559, 564, 514 N.Y.S.2d 55, 59
(2d Dep't 1987) (pain and suffering award may be based on effect of injuries on plaintiff's
ability to enjoy pleasures of life); Gallo, 112 App. Div. 2d at 347, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 798 (pain
and suffering damages compensate formerly confident man who became virtual recluse);
Bottone v. New York Tel. Co., 110 App. Div. 2d 922, 924, 487 N.Y.S.2d 170, 173 (3d Dep't
1985) (restrictions on past, present, and future activities compensable); Alexander v. Eldred,
100 App. Div. 2d 666, 666, 473 N.Y.S.2d 864, 866 (3d Dep't) (plaintiff compensated for dep-
rivation of ability to participate in recreational activities), aff'd, 63 N.Y.2d 460, 472 N.E.2d
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McDougald court appears to be asking jurors to make distinctions
which the New York courts have never drawn.33 Invariably, it is
submitted, this apportionment will lead to duplicative recovery
since jurors will increase the award for conscious pain and suffer-
ing if there is "objective" evidence of the suffering, and will con-
currently grant separate recompense in the form of damages for
loss of enjoyment of life based upon that same "objective"
evidence.
The McDougald court suggested that judicial review of ver-
dicts would be facilitated by recognizing loss of enjoyment of life
as a separate element of damages.3 4 This would comport with re-
cent legislative enactments attempting to control jury verdicts by
requiring itemized damages under the belief that appellate courts
can more readily determine the propriety of such awards."' Requir-
996, 483 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1984); Neal v. Rainbow House Fruits, 87 App. Div. 2d 511, 511, 447
N.Y.S.2d 487, 488 (1st Dep't 1982) (compensation for restriction of normal activities).
33 See McDougald, 135 App. Div. 2d at 89-91, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 197-99. The court ac-
knowledged the New York precedents, see id. at 89, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 197-98, but, nonethe-
less, carved out a distinct element of damages for loss of enjoyment of life. See id. at 91, 524
N.Y.S.2d at 198-99.
34 Id. at 91-92, 94, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 199-200. The court stated that segregation of loss of
enjoyment of life from conscious pain and suffering assists appellate review of "excessive-
ness." Id. See also Pierce v. New York Cent. R.R., 409 F.2d 1392, 1399 (6th Cir. 1969)
("Review of the award will be facilitated by separating it from pain and suffering, thereby
providing an additional safeguard against excessiveness."); 4B L. CHAPMAN, supra note 4, §
121.13, at 121-14 (separate treatment provides additional criteria for appellate review).
11 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. CPLR 4111(d) requires an itemized ver-
dict in medical, dental, or podiatric malpractice actions, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 4111(d)
(McKinney Supp. 1988), and CPLR 4111(f) extends this requirement to damages for per-
sonal injury, injury to property, or wrongful death. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 4111(f) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1988). The statutes list "medical expenses, dental expenses, loss of earnings, im-
pairment of earning ability, and pain and suffering" as the elements of recovery, but, as the
McDougald court properly recognized, the legislature expressly provided that the list was
not intended to be exclusive. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 4111(d)(f) (McKinney Supp. 1988). See
McDougald, 135 App. Div. 2d at 94, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
Another recent legislative enactment is CPLR 5501(c), N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5501(c)
(McKinney Supp. 1988), which provides that review of jury verdicts rendered pursuant to
CPLR 4111 shall be governed by the following standard: "[A]n award is excessive or inade-
quate if it deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation." Id. The provi-
sion applies to actions commenced on or after July 30, 1986. Id. at notes. Prior to this
addition, the appellate courts would overturn a jury's verdict only if it "shock[ed] the con-
science of the court." See Merrill v. Albany Medical Center Hosp., 126 App. Div. 2d 66, 68,
512 N.Y.S.2d 519, 520 (3d Dep't 1987); 1 T. NEWMAN, NEW YORK APPELLATE PRACTICE § 4.10,
at 4-24 (1986). Although the intent of the legislature was to facilitate appellate review, see
N.Y. Civ. PR~c. L. & R. 5501(c), commentary at 3 (McKinney Supp. 1988), one commentator
has suggested that the change is not necessarily monumental. See id. ("Is it all that unusual
for a judge's conscience to be shocked by a verdict that deviates materially from 'reasonable
compensation'?").
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ing jurors to separately allocate damages for medical expenses, loss
of earning capacity, and conscious pain and suffering allows the
courts to review such awards more effectively.38 It is submitted,
however, that in the context of attempting to distinguish loss of
enjoyment of life from conscious pain and suffering, the court has
suggested an illusory benefit. The mere fact that the elements are
conceptually distinguishable does not mean the losses can be indi-
vidually quantified. 7 The recognition of conscious pain and suffer-
ing as a singular loss, despite the theoretical distinction between
the two component elements, provides an apposite analogy for this
reasoning.38 Ultimately, it is suggested that even if juries are re-
quired to itemize the damages, the reviewing courts will be forced,
either expressly or tacitly, to merge loss of enjoyment of life and
conscious pain and suffering in recognition of the interrelation of
the two concepts.39
AFFORDING PROPER COMPENSATION FOR THE COMATOSE PLAINTIFF
Compensatory damages are designed to place the plaintiff in
the position he or she would have occupied had the injuries not
been sustained.40 Recovery for loss of enjoyment of life is correctly
A complementary enactment to CPLR 4111 and CPLR 5501(c) was the adoption of
CPLR 5522(b), N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 5522(b) (McKinney Supp. 1988), which requires the
appellate division to "set forth in its decision the reasons therefor, including the factors it
considered" if it rules on a verdict that was challenged as either being excessive or inade-
quate. Id. It was suggested that "[t]his will assure greater scrutiny of the amount of verdicts
and promote greater stability in the tort system and greater fairness for similarly situated
defendants throughout the State." Governor's Memorandum on Approval of ch. 682, N.Y.
Laws (1986), reprinted in [1986] N.Y. LEGIs. ANN. 289. See generally Newman, Damages: A
Call for Meaningful Precedents, 3 PACE L. REV. 605 passim (1983) (suggesting need for
establishment of meaningful precedents, which is exactly what CPLR 5522(b) is intended to
provide).
11 See supra notes 2, 34-35 and accompanying text.
17 See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. For a listing of cases that have in-
cluded loss of enjoyment of life as part of pain and suffering or general damages, see supra
notes 5 and 32. But cf. Comment, supra note 2, at 978 (suggesting distinction between pain
and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life often not drawn because of similar circumstances
and parallel methods of proof, yet submitting the two concepts are distinct).
See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
This is the precisely what occurred in the lower court in McDougald. See McDougald
v. Garber, 132 Misc. 2d 457, 462-63, 504 N.Y.S.2d 383, 387 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1986). The
trial judge noted that "Mrs. McDougald will never be able to engage in any of the activities
and relationships which constitute a normal life," id. at 460, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 385, but then
joined the separate jury verdicts for conscious pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of
life and reduced them as a single unit. See id. at 462, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
"0 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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factored into the determination of one's losses.41 The McDougald
court, relying expressly on decisions of the English courts that
have recognized "loss of amenities" as a distinct damage,42 held
that this loss is compensable regardless of the plaintiff's cognitive
awareness of the loss. 43 This is the proper result in light of the
limitation of recovery for pain and suffering to those plaintiffs
deemed "conscious" of their injuries.44 It would be anomalous to
allow a plaintiff who is not severely injured to recover for conscious
pain and suffering, often the largest component of the damage
award, while precluding one who is rendered comatose from receiv-
ing compensation for any non-pecuniary loss. 45 It is submitted that
41 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text; see also Sharapata v. Town of Islip, 56
N.Y.2d 332, 335, 437 N.E.2d 1104, 1105, 452 N.Y.S.2d 347, 348 ("fundamental purpose of
damages ... is to have the wrongdoer make the victim whole").
42 See supra note 23. But see Flannery v. United States, 297 S.E.2d 433, 439 n.9 (W.
Va. 1982) (despite recognizing loss of enjoyment of life as compensable to semi-comatose
plaintiff, court suggests reliance on English cases not helpful due to "differences in the Eng-
lish and [American] damage law"); D. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 8.1, at 549 (noting that English
courts have retained concept but have limited damages).
41 McDougald, 135 App. Div. 2d at 94, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
" See Fiederlein v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 56 N.Y.2d 573, 574, 435
N.E.2d 398, 399, 450 N.Y.S.2d 181, 182 (1982) ("Mere conjecture, surmise or speculation is
not enough to sustain a claim for damages."); Huertas v. State, 84 App. Div. 2d 650, 651, 444
N.Y.S.2d 307, 309 (3d Dep't 1981) (no evidence consciousness regained); Teller v. Fairchild,
67 App. Div. 2d 1105, 1106, 415 N.Y.S.2d 138, 140 (4th Dep't 1979) (requires conscious pain
and suffering); see also supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing conscious pain and
suffering).
15 See McDougald v. Garber, 132 Misc. 2d 457, 460, 504 N.Y.S.2d 383, 385-86 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1986). The trial judge stated:
Defendants maintain that no damages for the loss of the pleasures and pursuits of
life are recoverable unless that loss is consciously perceived. Accepting that argu-
ment would lead to the conclusion that a severely brain damaged plaintiff ren-
dered totally incapable of experiencing any conscious pain or appreciating his or
her condition would be entitled to no general damages. The subjective perception
standard urged by defendants would result in the paradoxical situation that the
greater the degree of brain damage inflicted by a negligent defendant, the smaller
the award the plaintiff can recover in general damages.
Id. The plaintiff would always retain the ability to recover for lost earning capacity and
medical expenses. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
Eradication of a similarly anomalous situation was behind the development of wrongful
death statutes. See W. KsrON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KE TON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 945 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON]. At com-
mon law, Lord Ellenborough stated that "in a civil court the death of a human being
[can]not be complained of as an injury," Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033
(1808), quoted in PROSSER AND KEETON, supra, § 127, at 945, leading to the unacceptable
conclusion that it was better for the defendant to kill the plaintiff than to merely injure
him. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra, § 127, at 945. For a general history of wrongful death
statutes, see 1 S. SPEIsER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH §§ 1.1-1.2, at 2-10 (2d ed. 1975).
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the McDougald court recognized this anomaly and, noting that the
limited cognitive capacity of the plaintiff would substantially di-
minish her recovery, deemed it necessary to permit recovery for
loss of enjoyment of life in the absence of cognitive awareness of
one's loss.
Adoption of such a standard could be objected to on the
grounds that the recovery of a comatose plaintiff for loss of enjoy-
ment of life will inure to a third party, rather than to the plaintiff,
thus creating a punitive award instead of a compensatory one."6
This analysis has been soundly rejected by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which has held that such
an award maintains its compensatory purpose.47 Additionally, the
McDougald court's holding does not substantially deviate from
prior rulings allowing recovery for loss of enjoyment of life by an
infant who has exhibited no understanding of the nature of his or
her loss. 4s Although these concepts are distinguishable, since the
4' See Flannery v. United States, 718 F.2d 108, 111 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1226 (1984). The Flannery court declared that if recovery by a comatose person for loss
of the ability to enjoy life is compensatory at all, "it is compensatory to those relatives who
will survive him." Id. The Flannery court disallowed such recovery by deeming it punitive
in nature and thereby violative of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976). See
Flannery, 718 F.2d at 111.
The Flannery case had an interesting procedural history. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit originally certified to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia the question of whether a plaintiff rendered semi-comatose could recover for loss of
enjoyment of life. Flannery v. United States, 649 F.2d 270, 273 (4th Cir. 1981). The West
Virginia court held that such recovery was permissible even though the plaintiff was not
aware of his loss. Flannery, 297 S.E.2d at 439. Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit deemed the
award punitive and disallowed recovery. Flannery, 718 F.2d at 111.
,7 See Rufino v. United States, 829 F.2d 354, 362 (2d Cir. 1987). The Rufino court
stated that "[t]he purpose of a recovery for loss of enjoyment of life is clearly to compensate
for that loss. The fact that the compensation may inure as a practical matter to third parties
in a given case does not transform the nature of the damages." Id. In reaching its conclu-
sion, the Rufino court relied on a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, Shaw v. United States, 741 F.2d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 1984), which had re-
fused to follow the Flannery ruling. See Rufino, 829 F.2d at 362.
18 See Kavanaugh v. Nussbaum, 129 App. Div. 2d 559, 564, 514 N.Y.S.2d 55, 59 (2d
Dep't 1987); Ledogar v. Giordano, 122 App. Div. 2d 834, 838, 505 N.Y.S.2d 899, 903 (2d
Dep't 1986). The Kavanaugh court noted that:
[A]lthough there is no evidence that the infant plaintiff is capable of fully appreci-
ating the consequences of his injuries, or that he is presently conscious of pain, an
award for pain and suffering may be based upon the effect that the injuries had
upon the infant plaintiff's ability to enjoy the normal pursuits and pleasures of
life.
Kavanaugh, 129 App. Div. 2d at 564, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 59 (citing Ledogar, 122 App. Div. 2d
at 838, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 903). See also Capelouto v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 7 Cal. 3d 889,
894-95, 500 P.2d 880, 884-85, 103 Cal. Rptr. 856, 860-61 (1972) (en banc) (infant need not
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child will eventually understand the limitations on his or her life
while the comatose individual will not,49 there is nonetheless a
time frame during which the child does not understand the loss,
and yet is permitted to receive compensation. Allowing recovery in
favor of a comatose plaintiff presents a logical extension of this
analysis. 50 However, if this recovery is still regarded as punitive, a
legislative enactment, similar to that adopted for survival stat-
utes,5' can be promulgated whereby the legislature can signify that,
as a matter of public policy, recovery for loss of enjoyment of life
by a comatose person is not punitive.
Allowing recovery for loss of enjoyment of life without con-
comitant cognitive awareness achieves the compensatory goal of
the American tort system.5 2 It is submitted, however, that the Mc-
Dougald court could have adequately afforded such compensation
without creating the duplicative recovery that resulted from the
demarcation of loss of enjoyment of life and conscious pain and
suffering. The court should have adopted a disjunctive standard
whereby a plaintiff could recover for conscious pain and suffering,
which includes loss of enjoyment of life, or, if no cognition was evi-
dent, the plaintiff could recover only for loss of enjoyment of life.5 3
explain pain to recover for pain and suffering); Flannery v. United States, 297 S.E.2d 433,
438-39 (W. Va. 1982) ("There are obviously many situations, particularly injuries to infants
or young children where [their] experience of life is so minimal that their ability to compre-
hend the extent of their permanent disability is negligible, and yet these young plaintiffs
have not been denied recovery for permanent injuries.").
4' See Brief for Appellants Armengol, Kulkarni, Sharma, and Empire Anesthesia Asso-
ciates at 48, McDougald, 135 App. Div. 2d at 80, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 192.
See Flannery, 297 S.E.2d at 438-39.
" See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-3.2(b) (McKinney Supp. 1988). The stat-
ute allows an action to be brought by a personal representative in favor of the decedent's
estate for any claim that could have been brought by the decedent. Id. Recovery pursuant to
this statute has included damages for conscious pain and suffering for the time between
injury and death despite the fact that it is clearly a windfall for a third party. See Stein v.
Lebowitz-Pine View Hotel, Inc., 111 App. Div. 2d 572, 573, 489 N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (3d Dep't
1985); Teller v. Fairchild, 67 App. Div. 2d 1105, 1106, 415 N.Y.S.2d 138, 139 (4th Dep't
1979); see also PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 45, § 126, at 943 (discussing windfall con-
cept). But see Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-3110 (1975) (disallowing damages for pain and
suffering in survival action); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.20.046 (1962) (same). For a general
discussion of survival statutes, see PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 45, § 126, at 942-45.
2 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. See also D. DoBBs, supra note 1, § 8.1, at
549-50 (suggesting that recovery for "lost years" could be allowed as "society's symbolic
statement of belief in the security of the person").
"' See Flannery, 297 S.E.2d at 435 n.2. The West Virginia court noted the memoran-
dum and order of the federal district court wherein this disjunctive standard was suggested.
Id. Another commentator has suggested the integration of the English view of loss of ameni-
ties into the American system by creating a general category of non-pecuniary damages for
LOSS OF ENJOYMENT OF LIFE
The same standard would be applicable to injuries sustained be-
tween the time of injury and that of death when survival statutes
are applicable.5 4 Adoption of such a rule would continue the prac-
tice of presenting the factual question of "consciousness" to ju-
ries"' and would enhance the ability of appellate courts to review
these juries' verdicts.56
CONCLUSION
The McDougald court was faced with the anomalous situation
whereby a plaintiff rendered comatose would have been precluded
from recovering damages for any non-pecuniary loss. The court
sought to prevent this result by distinguishing damages recover-
able for one's loss of enjoyment of life from those compensating
conscious pain and suffering. Unfortunately, the court established
a precedent that invariably leads to duplicative reparation for
plaintiffs. Limiting recognition of loss of enjoyment of life as a dis-
tinct component of damages to cases involving comatose plaintiffs
would effectively achieve the compensatory goal of the American
tort system without imposing punitive measures upon the
tortfeasor.
Eric L. Kriftcher
comatose tort victims. See Comment, supra note 23, at 1557-58.
The trial judge in McDougald appeared to recognize the problem but, it is submitted,
arrived at the wrong solution. Justice Gammerman stated that "[loss of the enjoyment of
life may ... accompany the physical sensation and emotional responses that we refer to as
pain and suffering and, in most cases, does. It is possible, however, for an injured person to
lose the enjoyment of life without experiencing any conscious pain and suffering." McDou-
gald v. Garber, 132 Misc. 2d 457, 462, 504 N.Y.S.2d 383, 386-87 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1986).
For a general discussion of survival statutes, see supra note 51 and accompanying
text.
See supra notes 22, 44 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 21, 35 and accompanying text. It is suggested that the courts must
carefully review awards for loss of enjoyment of life to insure equitable application of the
concept. The wealthy person who has lost the ability to travel or engage in extravagant
recreational activities has not necessarily "lost" any more than the poor person who can no
longer enjoy spending time with his or her family.
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